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  1Common Pool Resources and Social Norms:  Internal cost 
& Less than Full Compliance – Fishery example 
 
Heechan Kang and Timothy Haab 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In the recent years, the social norms
1 have been gained much attention from the 
economists as an important driving force of individual behavior. In particular, a number of 
studies (Ostrom, 1990) on the management of common-pool-resource (CPR) 
2by 
decentralized (endogenous) institutions constituted by local communities of individual have 
continuously reported the significance of social norm in accounting for the efficient 
sustainability of CPR. As Hardin (1968) described, this type of resources would be destined 
to be extinct eventually without specifying property right or intervention of a third party. 
However, it has been claimed by a number of recent field studies that this tragedy-of-
commons metaphor has been overcome in local commons such as forests, pastures and 
inshore fisheries (Ostrom, 1990; Somanathan, 1991; Bromley, 1992; McKean, 1992, and 
Acheson, 1993). In common, they argue that the social norm have always had a primary 
influence on an individual choice on CPR. A number of field studies also have documented 
that social norms usually are backed up by a variety of sanctions: frowning faces, verbal 
                                                 
1  Social norm is a rule of behavior. 
2 N. McCarthy et al(2001) define that these resources are characterized by joint access by a finite set of users 
and by rivalry in appropriation and Ostrom et al (1994) define the CPR are natural or humanly created systems 
that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person’s consumption 
subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others 
  2assaults, scorn and anger, destruction of equipment, formal punishments (fines) and so forth, 
which is deemed ‘external cost’ by non-compliers.  Furthermore, a collective sanction 
becomes more imperative as the extent of its impact on CPR increase and mutual trust by 
itself may not be sufficient to control people’s behavior. In contrast, some scholars have 
acknowledged another type of cost, called ‘internal cost’ which emerges internally for 
breaking social norms thus have a negative effect on one’s utility. Coleman (1987) makes the 
distinction between ‘externalized norms’ and ‘internalized norms’. Crawford and Ostrom 
(1995) argue that even though the internal cost is not easily observed, the forbidden behavior 
by a norm can bring it about for one engaging in that action.  
Despite the empirical documentation of potentially sustainable outcomes, however, 
theoretical explanations remain in their infancy. Since Hardin’s (1968) seminal work on the 
‘tragedy of the commons’, a number of models based on neo-classical economics have tried 
to explain the existence of common pool resource equilibria consisting of partial compliance 
or defection (Sethi and Somanathan, 1996; Haab and McConnell, 2002).  Of particular 
interest, evolutionary models of compliance, which incorporate the behavioral outcomes of 
others into individual decision making, have proven popular in explaining collective behavior 
problems associated with sustainable CPR outcomes. However, these evolutionary models 
fail to incorporate two commonly observed characteristics of common pool resource decision 
environments:  partial compliance equilibria and costly sanctioning behavior. 
Haab and McConnell (2002) develop a rudimentary evolutionary model of compliance 
behavior and show that heterogeneous distributions of compliance costs across a population 
can result in a less than full compliance equilibrium.  The model of Haab and McConnell 
ignores the possibility of endogenous sanctioning of deviant behavior.  Other evolutionary 
  3models of common pool behavior assume altruistic motives for sanctioning or costless 
sanctioning.   
       The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical explanation for partial compliance 
equilibria in a common pool resource allocation problem in the presence of costly sanction. 
First, the relationship between the external cost and the internal cost is provided. Second, 
with very stylized example such as fishery case where each player is assumed to play two 
stages evolutionary game, we will show that partial compliance exist and are stable, and 
furthermore, sanctioning behavior can be sustained by voluntary monitors among compliers.  
   
2.  Social norm, Sanction, communication and Internal cost 
 
  Of the particular features of common-pool-resource is the possibility of stock 
reduction rather than permanent abundance. One reflecting this feature is known as ‘marginal 
user cost’ or ‘shadow price’ of resource stock. Marginal user cost is an opportunity cost that 
appropriator pays for the reduction of a unit of future resource stock.  Thus, if the future 
resource stock is not reducible, marginal user cost would be negligible. Beside non-
renewable resource, stock of renewable resource can be reducible with harvesting activity 
when the harvesting rate is higher than the reproducing rate of that resource. According to 
neo-classical theory, with assumption of one harvester and one property right, this harvester 
is expected to maximize the present value of flow of profit over time. However, in a 
competitive harvesting situation (more than one harvester and no specifying property right), a 
rational harvester is expected not to consider this marginal user cost and maximize current 
flow of profit over time.    
  4A process to make people to recognize this marginal user cost is known as 
‘internalization’. At first, we can imagine the conventional centralized enforcement such as 
legal penalty (fine) or subsidy for noncompliance to make people internalize the marginal 
user cost. Here, in the absence of central enforcement, we approach this problem in a 
different way. Once the social norm is constructed by people who regularly are involved in 
using CPR, people recognize the social code of behavior (what is something ought or ought 
not). This rule of behavior already personalized in one’s mind can berate himself emotionally 
who does not obey a social norm and can be shared or transmitted through a channel of a 
persuasion. Here, this emotional self-rebuke is classified as an internal cost while the external 
persuasion employs carrot-and-stick expressed as communication (or moral suasion) and 
social (or personal) sanction. In other words, some individuals have an initial propensity to 
follow a norm because their embodied social norm can entail sufficient internal cost. Further, 
they are willing to keep persuading other people to recognize socially accepted norm by 
means of sanction and communication until almost everyone reciprocates and suffers 
sufficient level of internal cost.  
The general pattern of individual’s internal cost revealed in usage of common-pool 
circumstance is that it can be influenced by others’ strategies (Haab and McConnell, 2002). 
For example, they find that the recreation boaters are less likely to throw trash overboard 
when never seeing others discharging trash while they are more likely to throw trash 
overboard when observing others discharging trash. In other words, individuals may account 
for the actions of others when choosing their own behavior. This finding implies that as the 
number of defectors increases, individual would feel less guilty (less internal cost) when he 
  5chooses defection because it is not easy to separate his defecting behavior from many other 
defectors’.  
As for sanctions, we only focus on the totally decentralized social enforcement. In 
particular, we assume that each member of CPR is not allowed to be directly involved in 
personal sanctions. Instead, an endogenous institution takes charge of sanctioning any 
members of CPR engaging in defecting behaviors that are detected and reported by other 
members. As for social communication, like Ostrom (1990), who argues that commoners 
often establish an institution in order to ‘enforce’ and ‘share’ the established norms, we 
assume that the endogenous institution not only sanctions defectors but also arranges regular 
meetings to establish communication processes to convince members to adhere to social 
norm.  
While the idea of the external persuasion process such as social sanction and 
communication is intuitively appealing, its real effect on individual’s internal cost is 
activated only when these two processes comes together. The single-handed use of social 
sanction may be deemed a physical cost dispossessing a benefit acquired from a defecting 
attempt so that it may not be effectively transmitted into ones’ internal cost. On the other 
hand, the external persuasion with only communication may be regarded as an ineffective 
and untrustworthy method.  As a result, with aid of social sanction, communication process 
can have an impact on each individual’s own internal cost. On the other hand, with existence 
of a given level of communication process, social sanction can increase individual’s internal 
cost.   
The central insight of external persuasion is that it necessarily aggrandizes the extent 
of its level until everyone reciprocates and reaches a sufficient level of internal cost. In 
  6design principles of CPR in ‘Governing the Commons’ by Ostrom (1990), she argues that 
successful management CPR has been achieved by ‘graduated punishments’. Here, by 
extending her argument, we propose an external graduated persuasion process which can be 
intensified in accordance with the number of the defectors among the total number of 
appropriators. Equation (1) shows the external graduated persuasion process is a function of 
social sanction ( ) and communication (C ) both of which is intensified with the share of 
defectors ( ). Here, As a proxy of number of defectors, we choose a share of defectors ( ) 
which is a ratio of the number of defectors (
S
d d
D) over total number of appropriators ( ) 
( ). 
N
N D d / =
0 )) ( ), ( ( ≥ = d C d S f EP  where  0 / > ∂ ∂ d S and 0 / > ∂ ∂ d C                                 (1) 
To describe the mechanism of evolutionary behavior of defectors versus compliers, 
we need to examine the functional relationship of the internal cost with the number of 
defectors and the external persuasion. Here each individual is assumed to have a different 
internal cost affected by the share of defectors ( ) and external persuasion ( d EP).  
0 )) ( , ( ≥ = d EP d IC IC i i                                                                                         (2) 
All individuals find that internal costs are non-increasing in the share of 
defectors , and non-decreasing in the level of external 
persuasion . Since previously we assume that the external persuasion is 
strengthened in accordance with the share of defectors (
0 / ≤ ∂ ∂ d ICi
0 ) ( / ≥ ∂ ∂ d EP ICi
0 / ) ( ≥ ∂ ∂ d d EP ), the function of 
internal cost can be simplified as   0 ) ( ≥ = d IC IC i i  and thus as can be seen, the total impact 
of the share of defectors on individual’s internal cost is ambiguous ( 0 , / ≤ = ≥ ∂ ∂ or d IC ). 
According to this argument, the internal cost can either increase or decrease with the 
share of defectors, depending on prevalence of two oppositely directed effects. Internal cost 
  7is influenced not only reciprocally on one others’ strategies, but also by sanctions and 
communications. In one sense, as the number of defectors increases, individual would sense 
less guilty when he chooses defection (called ‘negative effect’). In another sense, as the 
number of defector increases, the external persuasion is intensified and thus individual would 
feel more guilty (called ‘positive effect’). As assumed before, the impact on internal cost by 
negative effect and positive effect is idiosyncratic. Heuristically, with initially fewer 
defectors, the negative effect is assumed to override the positive effect, while with larger 
defectors, the positive effect is assumed to dominate the negative effect.  
<Figure 1> individual’s internal cost and share of defectors
3
Internal cost  
                          
 
                             Ι                                    II 
 
                                                                               d (share of defectors) 
* d
<Figure 1> shows a general prototype of relationship between individual’s internal 
cost and the share of defector, in which the internal cost is U-shaped decreasing (an area I) 
and then increasing (an area II) with d . The switching point ( ) is not necessarily the same 
for all people. Some people who have stronger negative effect are more likely to have  on 
* d
* d
                                                 
3 Mathematically, in order to show quadratic function like U-shape, it is necessary to be assumed that the 















. However, here, the decreasing and then increasing internal cost with the share 
of defectors like V-shape is sufficient.   
  8the right side and some people who have stronger positive effect are more likely to have 
on the left side. On average,  is assumed to be located in the middle.   
* d
* d
To explain evolutionary system, let us assume that there is a hypothetical endogenous 
club of fisherman called the fisherman’s club, composed of all fishermen (N) in a given 
community. All new entrée into the fishery of this area should affiliate with this club
4. We 
assume that in this small and closed group, people know each other well, can communicate 
easily and actions taken by others are easily observed. This club has an institution in charge 
of three main executive roles; first, it constitutes a council establishing the internal rule 
(norm) binding each fisherman’s harvesting level. Second, it arrange meeting. Third, it has 
authority to allow any member of the club to monitor the defecting behavior in fishing levels, 
and when reported, sanction certainly those defectors instead of monitor.  
In this club, there are three kinds of members: compliers (C) who follow the social 
norm instituted by the council, defectors (D) who refuse to follow this norm, and monitors 
(M) who not only follow the social norm but also voluntarily monitor and report the 
defecting behavior at his own cost.  
Although these three different kinds of people (defector, complier and monitor) 
appear to coexist in the club at a particular time, we assume, there is hierarchical decision 
process where each individual first chooses between becoming ‘a complier’ and ‘a defector’, 
and then second takes position as either ‘a simple norm follower’ or ‘a monitor’. In the first 
decision stage, we assume that each fisherman can choose harvesting level either at 
(defector’s harvest level) or at  (complier’s harvest level). Harvesting levels in the 
middle are unavailable. However, the average level of harvesting in this club can be any level 
N h
C h
                                                 
4 We assume that new agent (entrée) can reduce the wealth of the former agent, and thus the cost of collective 
good depends on the size of the user group. See Aggrawal and Goyal (1999) for analysis of the case of scale 
economics in monitoring costs. 
  9between  and  because the average harvesting level (
N h
C h h ) of this community is 
determined by the following formulas
C N h d h d h * ) 1 ( * − + = , and 
C N h h h ≤ ≤  
In general, people always compare benefit and cost of their strategies. If the defecting 
benefit exceeds the defecting cost, then people choose to be defectors and vice versa.  
The defector’s payoff changes as follows: 
                                         (3)  ) ( )) ( , ( ) , ( ) , ( d S d EP d IC x h x h i
N N
i
N N − − = Π π
where the defector may incur internal costs ( ), or external cost like sanction ( ) or 
both. 
i IC ) (d S
The complier’s payoff is likewise: 
          
5 ) , ( ) , ( x h x h
C C
i
C C π = Π                                                                     (4) 
Here we define that an individual’s defecting benefit (  is   ) i DB




i i π π − − =
where   and  defector’s and complier’s revenue function, respectively 
increasing with harvesting level ( , ) and other composite goods ( ), and  is the 
graduated social sanction by the endogenous institution. We assume that this graduated social 
sanction is a stochastic variable because some defecting behavior may not be perfectly 
detected by monitors, all defecting behaviors may not be reported by monitors, and some 
monitors can be involved in private sanction although not permitted. On the other hand, an 
individual’s defecting cost ( ) is equivalent to internal cost  
) , ( x h
N N




C h x ) (d S
i DC
                          )) ( , ( d EP d IC DC i i =
                                                 
5 It is possible that the compliance behavior can incur costs, especially opportunity cost such as specific time 
cost to follow social norms. Here we assume that this cost may be constant so that it is not affected by the share 
of defectors. 
  10In the second decision stage, compliers choose either to be simple compliers or 
monitors. It may be essential that monitoring behavior entails the costs, for example, 
monitoring times. If this kind of cost is not sufficiently remunerated, it is irrational for 
monitor to incur a private cost. We propose that monitoring behaviors are supported by all 
compliers who observe them, who send positive image scorings (‘reputation’) to monitors. 
 
3. Evolutionary Game with internal cost 
 
The main differences of the evolutionary game from conventional game theory are 
that it assumes that each individual participates in the infinitely repeated game and exhibits 
limited rationality instead of full rationality. Thus, with his/her trial and error experience 
from an infinitely repeated game, he/she must choose the most profitable strategy at each 
stage instead of accurately calculating all future payoffs based on his/her own best strategy 
and other’s expected strategies. This approach is based on the principle that what works well 
for one player is more likely to be used again while what works poorly is more likely to be 
discarded (Axelord, 1984). The evolutionary principle works as though the more effective 
species are more likely to survive and reproduce in the biological systems. In particular, 
players observe each other and one who produces lower payoffs tends to imitate those who 
produce higher payoffs.  
With all above assumptions, we investigate the dynamics of a population through an 
evolutionary model. The norm game is described in <Figure 2>. 
 
 
  11<Figure 2> Two stages norm game 
Individual  i
Defector  Complier 
   
DB > DC  DB < DC 
Simple complier  Monitor  
   
R>MC R<MC 
DB    the defecting benefit 
DC    defecting (internal) cost 
R       reputation (positive image scoring) 
MC    monitoring cost 
 
3.1 Only one stage game  
In this section, we investigate the simplest case in which the external persuasion are 
not involved so that each individual only chooses either to be a complier or a defector 
according to his/her defecting benefit ( ) and internal cost ( ). The endogenous 
institution only engages in specifying social norms.  Thus, here we can expect that each 
member is involved in only a norm-guided restraint behavior. Based on this assumption, we 
will show that full compliance equilibrium is rarely possible and that full defection 
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First, a defector’s payoff is  
  12                        ) ( ) , ( ) , ( d IC x h x h i
N N
i
N N − = Π π
A complier’s payoff is  
                               ) , ( ) , ( x h x h
C C
i
C C π = Π
The change of the proportion of defector follows; 
                              ) ( Π − Π =
N d d &       Where 
C N d d Π − + Π = Π ) 1 (                (5) 
This equation indicates that the proportion of defector increases over time if the 
defector’s payoff is larger than average payoffs. In other words, people keep comparing 
defector’s payoff to average payoff, and if the defector’s payoff is greater than average 
payoff, then compliers will adopt the defectors’ strategy and incumbent defectors will 
continue their strategy. Equation (15) can be written as  
                                                                           (6)  ) ) 1 ( (
C N N d d d d Π − − Π − Π = &




i π π − − − =
In this one stage game, we note that a defecting benefit is  while a defecting 
cost is . A net defecting benefit ( ) is 
C N
i DB π π − =
) (d IC DCi = i NDB




i i − − = π π
 Based on equation (7), we can infer that current defectors can increase their net defecting 
benefit, as more people become defectors because  decrease with . Thus, once they have 
become defectors, they have no incentive to return to compliers because otherwise, they 
realize that the comparing net defecting benefit diminishes. On the reasonable inference, we 
assume that the defecting benefit is always non-negative ( ), otherwise, the 







  13minimum defecting (internal) cost level in his mind below which his internal cost cannot 
plummet even when all other people become defectors. 
To find the stable equilibrium of this equation, it is required that the derivative d with 
respect to   is negative at each equilibrium point.               
&
d
  [] ) )( 1 ( ) ( ) 2 1 (
d
IC
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and is negative when
C N Π > Π .                          (9) 




Π − Π =
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 and is negative when
N C Π > Π .                         (10) 
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* d d = 1 0
* < < d
N C Π = Π , 












                                                                 (11) 




ICi                                                                           
Based on derivative (9), it is evident that if ‘defecting benefit’ ( ) is 
greater than ‘defecting cost’ (
C N
i DB π π − =
i i IC DC = ) at 1 = d , then a full defection equilibrium is stable. 
A derivative (10) suggests that if defecting benefit is less than defecting cost at , then 
full compliance equilibrium can be stable. Based on (11), if the share of defector lies 
in , then the path does not stay in this equilibrium but converges to the full 
defection equilibrium.  
0 = d
1 0
* < < d
<Figure 3> shows stable Full Defecting Equilibrium (FDE) and stable Full 
Compliance Equilibrium (FCE) and unstable Partial Equilibrium. 
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      <Figure 3> The stable FDE and FCE and the unstable PCE 
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In <Figure 3>, we assume arbitrarily that there exist three different levels of defecting 
benefits ( ) such as , and   depending on the relative magnitude 
between  and . We note that defecting cost ( ) is decreasing with the share of 
defectors due to the reciprocal influence of the others’ behaviors.  Apparently, when the 
defecting benefit is extremely higher than the defecting cost ( ), full defecting 
equilibrium (hereafter FDE) is stable while full compliance equilibrium (hereafter FCE) is 
stable when the defecting benefit is extremely lower than minimum defecting cost 
( < ). However, in this case, we should note that this stable FCE exists only if 
we assume the minimum defecting cost ( ); otherwise, this path would converge 
inevitably to the full defecting equilibrium since we assume strictly positive defecting benefit 
( ) and irreversible conversion from compliers to defectors governed by 




i π π − ) 1 ( i DB )
i MinDC
2 ( i DB ) 3 ( i DB
N π
C π i DC
i i DC DB > ) 1 (
) 3 ( i DB
i MinDC
0 > −
C N π π
  151 0 < < d  because a conversion of one more person to a defector can make each individual’s 
defecting benefit exceeds defecting cost ( ), leading to the conversion of everyone 
else into defectors while inverse movement is unattainable since the internal cost is assumed 
always decreasing.  
i i DC DB >
These results suggest that the management of CPR with social norm backed only by 
internal cost may be unsuccessful. In fact, if ‘all’ members of a community have a high 
internal cost where even the minimum internal cost is higher than defecting benefit 
( ), then a CPR can be managed efficiently. However, if individual’s internal 
cost is heterogeneous (some people have low internal costs while others have high internal 
costs), then this CPR would be doomed to extinction, which is another example of ‘tragedy 
of commons’. Since heterogeneous internal cost among people is the most predictable case 
and we are unsure of whether a minimum internal cost exists for all people, a more 
reasonable case is a stable FDE. Therefore, in the next section, we will seek for the 
possibility of breakout from ‘tragedy of commons’ by including the external persuasion. 
i i DB MinIC >
 
3.2 Two stages game. 
 3.2.1 The first stage 
In this chapter, we add the second stage and consider the stage 1 and the stage 2 at the 
same time. The main difference from the previous model is that the endogenous institution 
can use the external persuasion process. As described before, the external persuasion process 
is only effective when the social sanction and communication are operated together. Here, we 
will show that the external persuasion process with only the social sanction can achieve the 
  16stable FCE only for a limited circumstance. On the other hand, the external persuasion 
process with both the graduated punishment rule and communication process can achieve not 
only stable FCE but also stable partial compliance equilibrium (hereafter PCE).  
 
(1) A game with the internal cost and the external graduated persuasion 
Here we investigate the most general case in which the endogenous institution 
chooses the social graduated sanction and the communication process. 
The defector’s payoff function changes as follows: 
                                    (12)  ) ( )) ( , ( ) , ( ) , ( d S d EP d IC x h x h i
N N N N − − = Π π
Now, the main difference between this and the previous defector’s payoff is that the 
graduated sanction can affect the defector’s payoff directly and indirectly as an argument of 
internal cost. The main reason the graduated sanction is included in the internal cost is that 
we assume that a communication process exists among members to persuade people to 
recognize the possibility of sanctions and to adhere to the social norm. As we investigated in 
the section 3, the changes in the internal cost along with the share of defectors rely mainly on 
the relative predominance between the positive effects and the negative effects. Here, as 
before, we assume the U shape of internal cost.  
The complier’s payoff function is the same as before. 
                        ) , ( ) , ( x h x h
C C C C π = Π
The change of the proportion of defector follows; 
                         ) ( Π − Π =
N d d &  Here 
C N d d Π − + Π = Π ) 1 (                            (13) 
                                      )) , ( ) ( )) ( , ( ) , ( )( 1 ( x h d S d EP d IC x h d d
C C
i
N N π π − − − − =
  17Again, we define defecting benefit as  while defecting cost is 
equivalent to . Now, we note that the defecting benefit is no longer 
constant but decreasing with the share of defector because sanction is assumed to intensified 
with the share of defectors (
) (d S DB
C N
i − − = π π
)) ( , ( d EP d IC DC i i =
0 ) ( > ∂
∂
d
d S ). A net defecting benefit ( ) is  i NDB
) ( )) ( , ( ) , ( ) , ( d S d EP d IC x h x h NDB i
C C N N
i − − − = π π   
Compared to the previous no external persuasion case, this defector may not always 
increase his net defecting benefit with more defectors because thereby they may suffer more 
social sanctions and more internal cost. Possibly, they may have incentive to return to 
compliers as internal cost and the external persuasion increase.  
Here as assumed before, individual’s defection benefit can not be negative 
(0 ) ) ( > − − d S
C N π π
6. In other words, even if possible, endogenous institution may set the 
maximum level of social sanction until defecting benefit is zero.  
The stable equilibrium condition requires that the derivative  with respect to   is 
negative at each equilibrium point.  
d & d
  )
) ( ) (
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Π − Π =
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 and is negative if
C N Π > Π .                     (15) 




Π − Π =
∂
∂&
and is negative if
N C Π > Π .                      (16) 
                                                 
6 This assumption is only for a convenience. The endogenous institution can increase the level of the graduated 
sanction as much as to make the defecting benefit zero or negative. In either case, there would be no room for 
internal cost. We assume that one of the main goals of the sanction is to increase or foster each individual’s 
internal cost. Thus, the endogenous institution may not choose the policy, which expels all possibilities to 
increase internal cost.   
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FDE is stable (equation (29)) if 
C N Π > Π is true at 1 = d . FCE is also stable (equation 
(30)) if  is true at . 
N C Π > Π 0 = d
 <Figure 4> shows the potential cases of FCE and FDE. In contrast to the previous 
only one stage game, internal cost is more likely to show U shape because there is interaction 
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). We also note 
that the defecting benefit ( ) is decreasing with the share of defectors  ) (d S
C N − −π π
                                            
         <Figure 4> the stable FCE and FDE 
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In <Figure 4>, we assume arbitrarily two levels of defecting benefits 
( and ). Comparing   and , we can notice that if the defecting benefit 
is always greater than the defecting cost over all level of , then full defection equilibrium 
) (I DB ) (II DB ) (I DB i DC
d
  19(FDE) is stable. In addition, comparison between and implies that full compliance 
equilibrium (FCE) is stable if defecting benefit is always less than the internal cost over all 
level of . 
) (II DB i DC
d
Here we analyze the partial compliance (defection) equilibrium case. Prior to the 
main explanation, we need to pose some assumptions with regard to the defecting benefit and 
the social sanction.   
            <Figure 5> Max and Min     DB
i DC ,         i DB
MAX DB
                                                                             (A) 
                                    
                                                           i DC
                       
MIN DB
                                         (B) 
               0                                                          1    d 
 
Suppose that the endogenous institution impose the social sanction to the defectors 
according to its predetermined rule. They follow this rule: β α + = d d S * ) (  
For a convenience, we assume that α is constant but β  is adjustable. Applying this to 
individual defecting benefit, we have a defecting benefit function such as  
                          β α π π − − − = d DB
C N *
As we move the defecting benefit vertically by adjustingβ , the defecting benefit 
lines meet the internal cost curve at two points (A) and (B) in <Figure 5>. We note that at 
point (A), the defecting benefit line meets the internal cost curve where , and at point 
(B), the defecting benefit line is tangent to the internal cost curve. Let us define ‘the 
1 = d
  20maximum level of defecting benefit ( ) where DB line meets DC curve at point (A) 





If the sanctioning level is set such that the defecting benefit lies between the minimum 
DB and the maximum DB ( 
MAX MIN DB DB DB < < ), then the DB line meets the internal cost 








































, is unstable partial compliance equilibrium while 



















, is a stable partial 
compliance equilibrium.    
<Figure 6> the potential (un)stable partial compliance equilibriums. 
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In <Figure 6>, we draw the picture to plot the defecting benefit, which lies between 
minimum DB and the maximum DB ( 
MAX MIN DB DB DB < < ), case (i) shows that the 
  21defecting benefit line meets the internal cost at one point while the case (ii) shows that the 
defecting benefit line meets the internal cost at two points.  An empty point (a) designates the 
unstable equilibrium while the dotted points (b) and (c) designate the stable equilibriums.  
Point (a) is an unstable equilibrium because it is nested in the area I where the internal 














. Thus, a deviation from this point can make the 
path converges to the stable partial compliance equilibrium (b). For example, a conversion of 
one more person to be a defector makes each individual’s defecting benefit exceed the 
defecting cost ( ), which leads to more defectors until the path converges to the 
point (b).  On the other hand, equilibrium point (b) and (c) are stable because they are nested 
in the area II where the internal cost is increasing, that is, 














. Thus, any 
attempt to deviate from this point has a propensity to return to this point again. For example, 
from point (b) or (c), a conversion of one more person to be a complier makes each 
individual’s defecting benefit exceed defecting cost, leading to more defectors while a 
conversion of one more person to be a defector makes each individual’s defecting benefit less 
than his defecting cost, leading to more compliers.  
The results from this analysis indicate that if the endogenous institution sets the level 
of graduated punishment at the point in which the defecting benefit lies between the 
minimum DB and the maximum DB ( 
MAX MIN DB DB DB < < ), the path of evolution always 
converges to the stable partial compliance equilibrium regardless of the initial share of 
defectors.  
These results suggest an important implication for policy. This community of CPR 
can achieve the full compliance equilibrium only if the graduated punishment level is set so 
  22that the internal cost is always greater than the defecting benefit. On the other hand, if the 
graduated punishment level is set so that defecting benefit is always greater than internal cost, 
then this community becomes a full defection. In the middle case, only partial compliance 
equilibrium is stable.   
 
(2) A game only with the graduated sanction but no communication 
Here, we suppose that the endogenous institution only chooses the social graduated 
sanction while not allowing the communication process. The defector’s payoff function 
changes as follows: 
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) (d IC decreases over the share of defectors because   cannot go into internal cost due to 
absence of the communication process. 
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The complier’s payoff function is the same as before. 
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From this derivative, we note that the full compliance equilibrium is stable when 
always  regardless of the share of defectors and the full defection equilibrium is 
C N Π > Π
  23stable when always  regardless of the share of defectors. Since






ICi , partial 
compliance equilibrium is not stable. We can note that this evolutionary model is almost the 
same as the one stage game in section 4.1 except for a decreasing defecting benefit. Like the 
previous results, the stable full compliance equilibrium is possible only if we assume the 
minimum internal cost. These results suggest that the management of CPR with only 
graduated sanction may be unsuccessful. 
 
3.2.2 The second stage game  
Among the stable equilibriums in the first stage, it may not be possible to rank that 
one is better than the others. However, partial compliance equilibrium may coincide with a 
casual real world observation where some portions of the population are defector and others 
are compliers. Thus, the following paper proceeds with this partial compliance equilibrium 
that would be considered the most general case. In addition, prior to the second stage game, 
the most crucial finding (or assumption) is that the partial compliance equilibrium in the first 
stage is steady state, which means the ratio of compliers (or defectors) would be unchanged 
over long periods of time.  
Once the first stage is complete, the compliers are ready to play in the second stage. 
In this next stage, compliers choose either to become simple compliers or monitors. This 
second stage game is called a ‘reputation game’ because all compliers have incentive to 
increase their reputation from this second stage game. Each complier sends and receives 
positive image scoring to all other compliers at the same time. In particular, people who 
decide to monitor defecting behaviors additionally receive more reputation (positive image-
scorings) due to the additional cost (monitoring cost) which they pay. Receiving positive 
  24image scorings is based on the findings of Horne and Cultip (2002) and Horne (2000), which 
reveal that people willingly support sanctioning behavior. In their model, sanctioning subject 
is assumed to participate in an actual punishment behavior by hypothetically paying a 
sanctioning cost. Meanwhile, our model assumes that the endogenous institution participates 
in an actual sanction instead according to report (notice) from monitors within community. 
We expect that in our model the monitors who also pay the monitoring cost can earn the 
same amount of positive image scoring as their models without much modification. For a 
convenience, we make three assumptions. First, the defectors in the first stage cannot be 
monitors simultaneously.  Second, the positive image scoring sent for compliance behavior 
itself is negligible. Third, one monitor’s positive image scoring sent to other monitors is 
perfectly offset by his received ones from other monitors. Thus, it seems that compliers are 
the image sending parts while monitors serve as the image receiving parts. The first and the 
second assumptions exclude the case in which the defectors in the first stage disguise 
themselves as compliers in order to get into the second stage game.  They may have no 
incentive to send positive image scoring in favor of monitoring behavior because, once then, 
more and more true complier have incentive to become monitors, leading to increasing the 
possibility for defecting behavior to be detected. On the other hand, in return, they gain 
negligible positive image scoring for covering them up as compliers.   
One monitor’s reputation is an average of total positive image scoring sent by all 
compliers. To increase reputation for monitoring behavior, we assume, the endogenous 
institution discloses the list of all monitors periodically; thus, all compliers can recognize 
monitors’ behaviors and send positive image scoring.  Explicitly, 
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  25Here,R represents the average reputation given to each monitor. M is the total 
number of monitors,  is the total number of simple complies, C  (= ) is the total 
number of compliers as a result of the first stage game, and 
S S M +
i ω is the sending image scoring 
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For a simplicity, we assume that the total positive image scorings ( ) earned 









). In addition, 
we assume that each complier sends the same amount of sending image scoring 
( ).  ω ω × = ∑ S
S
i
From (30), we can figure out that R always increases with the share of the simple 
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In <Figure 7>, we note that the benefit to choose a monitor is always positive as long 
as a society has at least one simple complier, and this benefit becomes greater if this society 
has more simple compliers. At the rudimental monitor-sanction process, the anchored 
                                                 
7 In fact, the reputation, when the community is consist of the full monitors, may not be zero because it is 
possible that the sending positive image to other monitors scoring is not always perfectly offset by receiving 
ones from other monitors. However, for a convenience, we follow the simplest assumptions. 
  26monitoring behavior would be rewarded with high reputation, but as the number of monitors 
increases, the benefit in average reputation decreases because the sending part (simple 
compliers) shrinks and the receiving part (monitors) increases.  
On the other hand, the monitoring behavior entails the cost including a private time 
cost for monitoring activity. For simplicity, monitoring cost is assumed constant.  
In fact, all compliers who are ready to play the second stage game compare the 
benefit (reputation) to the cost (monitoring cost) and make decision on strategy. If reputation 
(R ) is greater than monitoring cost ( ), then compliers have incentive to become 
monitors. If not, it would be better to remain as simple compliers. 
MC
We have to note that reputation works as follow: it affects utility positively in such a 
way that reputation either endows happiness to monitors directly or helps other economic 
transactions with other people. On the other hand, the total reputation heavily relies on the 
size of the community, the degree of intimacy among people, the degree of frequency 
meeting same people again and the proportion of total compliers in the given community. 
With the relatively large size of members, we can expect that the intimacy and the degree of 
frequency meeting same people again declines. Thus, the reputation from a given compliance 
behavior can be small. Here we assume that the size of group is relatively small as before, 
and there are frequent relationships among members.  
  Now, we define that the monitor’s payoff is 
                                                                                       (19)  MC s R
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Here,  is an average reputation dependent on the share of simple compliers ( ), and 
is a constant monitoring cost.  
) (s R s
MC
The simple complier’s payoff is the same as before 
  27                                                                                                               (20) 
C S π = Π
Keeping in mind that people are still limitedly rational, and at steady state from the 
first stage, the share of compliers (or share of defectors) was stable in a partial compliance 
equilibrium, we will find the conditions for stable equilibrium.  
The change of the share of simple compliers is 
                   ) (
C S s s Π − Π = &  where 
M S C s s Π − + Π = Π ) 1 (                                (21) 
This equation indicates that the share of simple compliers increases over time if their 
payoff is larger than the average payoffs of compliers. In other words, according to the 
comparison between monitoring cost and reputation, they choose between simple compliance 
and monitoring. If the monitoring cost is higher than potential reputation gain, they would 
choose simple compliance. Otherwise, they would choose monitoring.  
Equation (33) can be written as  
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To find stable equilibrium of this equation, it is required to take a derivative  with respect 
to  then check whether the sign is negative at each equilibrium point.  
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 In (36), we note that at 1 = s , the reputation ∞ = ) (s R . Therefore, this equilibrium 
cannot be stable because  can not be greater than infinity. In (34), we also note that 
at , the reputation . This means that this equilibrium cannot be stable unless 
monitoring cost is negative, which is unimaginable. Therefore, the unique stable equilibrium 
is a partial equilibrium consisting of some simple compliers and monitors in which .  
MC
0 = s 0 ) ( = s R
1 0
* < < s
                  <Figure 8> Stable Partial equilibrium 
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As can be seen in <Figure 8>, the partial compliance at  is stable because deviation 
from this point tends to return to this point. For example, one more person becoming a 
monitor makes . This forces that person to return as a simple complier. One more 
person becoming a simple complier makes . This forces that person to return as a 
monitor.   
* s
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  294. Implication 
Consequence of this two stage game is that in this community, there co-exist the 
defectors ( ), the simple compliers ( ) and the monitors 
( ). Continued with the first stage game stage game, the main drawback of this 
two stage game is that the social sanction in the first stage governed by total monitoring 
activity in the second stage is not necessary to be sufficient enough to guarantee the partial 
compliance equilibrium. For example, it is possible that sometimes the total monitoring 
activity determined in the second stage game falls short to support a certain level of the social 
sanction assuring the partial compliance equilibrium.    
N d D × =
* * * * * *C s S =
* * * S C M − =
To avoid this problem, the endogenous institution can target two main methods: first, 
they can attempt to change the shape of internal cost so that the switching point is more 
likely to be close to the origin. This goal is possible if the positive effect of the share of 
defectors dominates the negative effect of it. Only possible way to achieve it is to increase 
the communication process for a given level of the social sanction. Second, they can change 
the social setting affecting reputation for the monitoring behavior. The reputation for a given 
community depends on individual specific way to appreciate monitoring behaviors and social 
foundation. Although we ignore the difference of individual specific appreciation in our 
analysis, this part may be devoted for future studies. On the other hand, how much people 
appreciate the reputation relies on many factors such as social mechanism of endowment of 
reputation for given compliance behavior, education and the cultural constraint. Therefore, if 
the endogenous institution changes social foundation in order to foster the means to increase 
the reputation for a given monitoring behavior, as we investigated in the second stage game, 
more compliers have incentive to become monitors.   
  30 
5. Conclusion 
 
In our paper, we attempt to develop the theoretical model describing the empirical 
evidences of the common pool resources. The real world observation shows that some 
common pool resources are managed more efficiently than the ‘tragedy of common’ by less 
than all compliers (the partial compliance equilibrium). With U shape of internal cost 
function and the graduated punishment mechanism, we show that the partial compliance 
equilibrium is stable and observable frequently. In addition, we show that some compliers 
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